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TRADING REMEDIES TO REMEDY TRADE: THE
NAFTA EXPERIENCE
INTRODUCTION
After World War II, many countries shared the perception that as
part of the effort of attaining a more politically stable and economically
integrated international environment; accomplishing trade discipline and
liberalization was fundamental. Thus, a new set of multilateral institutions
and rules were adopted with the purpose of reducing and eventually
eliminating all tariff and non-tariff trade barriers. In addition, this new le-
gal framework also provided for trade remedy measures so that the
governments could remedy the situation of their domestic industry, when
materially or seriously injured as a consequence of unfair trade practices
antidumping (AD) or countervailing duty (CV) measures, or simply by the
trade liberalization itself (safeguard measures).
This paper focuses on the use of unfair trade laws in North America.
Therefore it looks at how much have NAFTA parties (Canada, Mexico and
the United States) have resorted to or traded AD and CV remedies to
influence their trade with other countries, and particularly between
themselves, prior to and after the entry into force of the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Three methods are used to determine
which of these three countries has more intensively applied unfair trade167
practices measures affecting intra-NAFTA trade. Particularly interesting is
the analysis of whether the initiations by each NAFTA party, affecting intra-
NAFTA imports, diminished with the implementation of the AD and CV
commitments contemplated under Chapter 19 of the NAFTA.
In addition, complementing Chapter 19 objectives, an assessment
is offered relative to the functioning of Chapter 19’s binational review
panel system, based on the experience of 75 cases filed during the first
eight years of NAFTA’s implementation (January 1994 - January 2002).
Specific suggestions are included pertaining to the possibility of observing
a reduction or elimination of the application of AD and CV laws, or to the
negotiation of less trade-restrictive AD and CV rules to be applied between
the NAFTA partners. As an introduction to these issues,  general reference
is first made to the nature, objective, evolution and international legal
framework of AD and CV measures.
OVERVIEW OF AD AND CD MEASURES
Antidumping And Countervailing Measures
The practice of exporting dumped or subsidized goods1 has been
considered unfair at a national and a multilateral level, since these products
compete with identical or similar goods in the export market, placing
domestic producers in a situation of disadvantage. Consequently, through
the application of AD or CV duties, governments intend to level the playing
field so that all producers are able to compete in equal terms.
Canada was the first country to pass an antidumping law in 1904,
as a consequence of the pressure exerted by Canadian steelmakers who
demanded higher tariffs on U.S. steel rails. They alleged that as railroad
____________________
1  A “dumped good” is a good exported at a price lower than the price it is sold in its
country of origin, or if the home market price cannot be determined, when the export
price is lower than the price of the same or a comparable product in a third market, or
alternatively, lower than the exporter’s cost of production. A “subsidized good” is a
good in which its producer has received a financial contribution by its government or
any public body or a private body acting on its behalf, that confers a benefit to the
recipient.
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building began to surge once Canada’s transcontinental railroad was
completed in 1885, the U.S. Steel Corporation was unfairly aggressive and
was dumping rails into the Canadian market. Since Canada could not limit
the tariff increase to steel rails, its government was aware that once it revised
the tariff for such good, other producers to which it owed political debt
would also demand tariff increases on imported competing products.2  By
1921, the United States, France, Great Britain and most of the British
Commonwealth countries had adopted antidumping laws. Although dum-
ping was not a new issue,3 the passage of such AD laws at that time res-
ponded to particular circumstances which happened to concur:
• the perception that as World War I neared its end “the German
government was accumulating vast stocks of goods in order to
dump them on the markets of the world and regain in the field of
economic warfare what she was losing on the military battlefield.”4
• the concern at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of
the 20th, of the need to regulate the evils of predatory trusts,
especially when practiced by foreigners.
• the need to lower high tariffs which “provided national firms the
opportunity to price monopolistically at home and at the same
time protected them from re-import of goods they sold
competitively in world markets.”5
Despite the adoption of AD legislation, countries for many more
decades continued to protect their industries, basically through tariffs and
quotas. With the progressive elimination of the latter, as well as other non-
tariff barriers, since the 1970’s countries began to rely more frequently on
____________________
2  Michael Finger, “The Origins and Evolution of Antidumping Regulation,”
Antidumping- How it Works and Who Gets Hurt, J. Michael Finger (ed.), Ann Arbor, The
University of Michigan Press, 1993, pp. 13-14.
3  “Jacob Viner (1923), the first scholar to pull together previous writing on the subject,
notes a sixteenth century English writer who charged foreigners with selling paper at a
loss to smother the infant paper industry in England. Viner also notes an instance in the
seventeenth century in which the Dutch were accused of selling in the Baltic regions at
ruinously low prices to drive out French merchants.” Ibid., p. 13 -14.
4 Ibid, Jacob Viner, cited in p. 16.
5  Ibid., p. 17.169
their unfair trade practice laws, especially to those which regulate the AD
procedure.6  Since 1948, multilaterally through the General Agreement of
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), contracting parties have recognized and regulated
the right of parties to impose AD and CV duties if domestic production has
been injured or is threaten to be injured.7 Ad duties are imposed despite
concern that the abuse in the application of AD laws might hamper the
trade liberalization commitments of the Agreement.
In 1955, new principles and disciplines were agreed with respect
to subsidies under the GATT, yet important aspects remained undefined.
Antidumping did not become a significant GATT issue until the Kennedy
Round (1964-1967) of multilateral trade negotiations (MTN) where an
Antidumping Code was drafted. However, since the U.S. Congress did not
approve it, the Code never came into effect. In the years that followed the
use of AD laws expanded, where the dominant question became “How
can antidumping be applied to this problem?” instead of asking “Was the
problem caused by dumping?”
Specific agreements on dumping and subsidies were achieved in
1979, with the conclusion of the MTN of the Tokyo Round (1973-1979).
The Antidumping Code and the Subsidies and Countervailing Duties Codes
contributed to strengthening the protection regime against unfair trade
practices. In the view of Michael Finger the “agreement helped transform
antidumping from a minor instrument for restricting imports to a major
____________________
6  The outnumbering of AD investigations compared to CV investigations basically
responds to:
i) The difference in nature of dumped and subsidized goods: while the former
are linked to enterprises behavior, the latter to government actions.
Consequently, the determination of CV measures has a greater impact in
diplomatic relations, since the government of the importing country determi-
nes whether the government policy or policies of another sovereign state are
legitimate or not and shall therefore be actionable or not.
ii) The fact that governments tend to subsidize in a lesser degree than private
industries to price discriminate.
iii)The preparation, gathering of proofs, and procedures of antidumping cases are
less complicated than subsidies investigations.
7  GATT, Articles VI and XVI.
Leycegui and Cornejo170 Keeping the Borders Open
one.”  He adds that “as antidumping became more and more detailed, its
motive became more and more to find a way to fit antidumping to each
immediate problem. (If your favorite tool is a hammer, your problems will
all look like nails).”8  In this respect Lowenfeld notes that the substance of
trade disputes is the effect on the importer, not the behavior of the exporter
and therefore the Tokyo Round’s mistake consisted in focusing on the
differences between fair and unfair trade, when the real focus is on
acceptable vs. unacceptable level of trade or market share or import
penetration.9
Some years later, as a consequence of the MTN of the Uruguay
Round (1986-1994), where a new GATT was negotiated (GATT 1994) and
the World Trade Organization (WTO) established, also new agreements on
antidumping and subsidies were adopted by all Members of the newly
founded WTO. The new Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI of
GATT 1994 (the Antidumping Agreement) and the Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement) were built on the 1979
Antidumping Code and Subsidies and Countervailing Duties Code
negotiated under the Tokyo Round. Departing from the former, these two
new Agreements apply to all WTO Members.
The Antidumping Agreement requires greater transparency and
establishes new methodological rules regarding the determination of dum-
ping (e.g. as to the calculation of cost of production to include reasonable
administrative and selling costs, and profit; the margin of dumping shall
normally be calculated either from a comparison of the weighted average
normal value in the home market with the weighted average of prices of all
comparable exports, or on a transaction-to-transaction basis; and sales
below cost). It further disciplines the application of AD measures by
establishing new rules related to injury determinations, procedures to
conduct investigations, imposing duties, reviewing determinations and
terminating antidumping duties. Furthermore, the Antidumping Agreement
introduces a special standard of review rule: If the WTO Member’s
____________________
8  Michael Finger, op. cit., pp. 59, 63 and 65.
9  Ibid., pp. 59 and 63.171
authority’s have established the facts of a case properly, and made and
unbiased and objective evaluation of these facts, the evaluation shall not
be overturned, even though the panel might have reached a different
conclusion. In addition, as to panel’s interpretation rules, the Agreement
establishes that if a panel finds that one of its provisions admits of more
than one permissible interpretation, it shall find the authorities measure to
be in conformity with the Agreement if it rests upon one of those permissible
interpretations of the Agreement.
It is also worth highlighting the main accomplishments of the Uru-
guay Round SCM Agreement:
• it identifies the three necessary elements for a subsidy to exist
i) financial contribution,
ii) made by a government or public body within a territory of a
WTO member, and
iii) the contribution confers a benefit;
• aside from disciplining the use of export subsidies, it also does
so for production subsidies;
• it adopts a “traffic light approach” for identifying three different
type of subsidies, in which each category is subject to different
consequences due to their diverse nature:
- “Green subsidies” or non actionable subsidies, considered to
unlikely cause harm to trade (non-specific subsidies, or those
which provide assistance: for basic research, to disadvantaged
regions; to adapt existing facilities to new environmental
standards.
- “Red subsidies” or “prohibited subsidies”, considered clearly
harmful to trade (those contingent to export performance or to
the use of domestic inputs).
- “Amber subsidies”or actionable subsidies, only challengeable
if they cause adverse effects (serious prejudice, injury, or
nullification and impairment of benefits). The Agreement
establishes rebuttal presumptions of when subsidies give rise
to adverse effects.
• it provides for a more expeditious dispute settlement procedure
for actionable subsidies.
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• it introduced special provisions in favor of developing countries,
perhaps of greater impact than all those introduced in other
Agreements of the WTO.
However, despite the progress made multilaterally in the field of
trade remedies, achieving full transparency and discipline in the application
of AD and CV measures remains to be among the most important challenges
facing the international community. The former since countries continue
to abuse in the application of such laws, mainly the AD ones, constituting
today one of the most important barriers to legitimate international
competition.
TRADE REMEDY LAWS IN NORTH AMERICA
Mexico10
From 1987 to 1999,11 Mexico initiated a total of 228 AD/CV
investigations.12   Most of these investigations have been AD cases with a
share of 92 percent (210 proceedings), leaving CV cases with the remaining
8 percent (18 proceedings). This number of AD cases places the Mexican
system as one of the most active worldwide. From 1987 to 1997, Mexico
ranked fourth in initiations of AD cases, along with Canada.13 Table 1
____________________
10  The statistical information included in this section was prepared by the authors from
the following sources: the 2000 Annual Report of the UPCI, the UPCI’s database. In
some instances it was necessary to consult the final determinations published in the
Federal Official Bulletin  (Diario Oficial de la Federación).
11  The data used do not go beyond 1999, even though at the time this paper was written
there was information on initiations available until 2001. The reason being that through
the exclusion of the unconcluded cases initiated in 2000 and 2001, it was possible to
determine the rate of cases in which final measures were imposed to the total number of
cases. It is also important to note that the final measures reported in this document
reflect those imposed and not the measures currently in effect.
12  The cases are measured by product, country and type of procedure (AD or CV). For
example, the Mexican AD and CV investigations regarding cold-rolled sheet and hot-
rolled sheet from Venezuela and Brazil are considered as eight different proceedings,
since an AD and CV investigation for each product was initiated against each country.
13  See Jorge Miranda, Raúl Torres, and Mario Ruiz, “The International Use of
Antidumping: 1987-1997”, Journal of World Trade, Vol. 32, No. 5, October , 1998, pp.
6 – 7.173
shows the number of cases and measures14 by type of procedure. The last
column, “success ratio,” is the result of dividing the number of final AD
and CV measures imposed by the number of initiations; and thus represents
the probability that an initiation concludes with a final measure. The data
below indicate that AD measures were imposed in 53 percent of the initiated
cases; whereas CV measures were imposed in 44 percent of them.
Consequently, a petitioner has roughly 50 percent of probability of obtaining
a favorable outcome.
During the period of study, Mexico initiated cases against 43
countries. The three most affected were the United States followed by Chi-
na and Brazil. These countries account for 56 percent of the total number
of cases. Table 2 shows the 11 countries most affected by initiations, the
final measures imposed and the success ratio. Whether each subject country
is over/under-represented in the total number of investigations or measures
goes beyond the scope of this paper.15 In any event, it is interesting to see
countries like China, Brazil or Venezuela in the first places of countries
under investigation by Mexico, when they are far from representing such
an important role in terms of the total value of Mexico’s imports.16
Table 1: Mexican AD/CVD Cases and Measures by Type of Procedure,
1987-1999.
  Number    Share in Number of   Share in
Type of      of    the total    final    the total Success
Investigation Initiations of initiations measures of measures   Ratio
     (%)      (%)
Antidumping 210 92 111 93 0.53
Countervailing 18 8 8 7 0.44
Total 228 100 119 100 0.52
Source: Made by the authors with information from UPCI’s Annual Report 2000
and case database, and complemented with research by the authors.
____________________
14   Final measures include duties as well as price undertakings.
15  Miranda makes a deeper analysis of this matter in “An Economic Analysis of Mexico’s
Use of Trade Remedy Laws from 1987 to 1995” in Beatriz Leycegui et al, Trading
Punches: Trade Remedy Law and Disputes Under NAFTA. North American Committee,
pp. 137-160.
16  One possible and partial answer to this is that, as we will point out later, the base
metal sector is the most active in AD/CV initiations, and countries like Brazil and
Venezuela are important exporters of products of such sector.
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Differences between the success ratio of certain countries is
significant. The probability of “succeeding in” a case involving a Chinese
product is the double than a case against a U.S. product. The low success
ratio involving investigations against “other countries,” is explained by the
fact that nearly 40 percent of these proceedings involve ex-Soviet Union
states (19 cases), where only one measure was adopted (0.05 success
ratio).17 Remarkably, the United States and Canada, as well as Korea’s
success ratios are below the average ratio.
Table 3 shows the AD/CV initiations and measures by HS Section.18
Three HS Sections account for over 66 percent of the initiations: base metals
(36 percent), chemicals (20 percent), and textiles (10 percent). Other
important players are plastics (7 percent) and electrical equipment (6
percent). Except for chemicals, the other four Sections mentioned have
success ratios over the average, with ratios from 54 percent in the case of
base metals and electrical equipment to 65 percent in the case of plastics.
United States
From 1987 to 1997 the United States was the country with most
AD cases initiated and measures19 imposed worldwide.20 During this period
the United States initiated 598 AD/CV investigations. Eighty-one percent
of the initiations involved dumping allegations (484 cases) and 19 percent
subsidies (114 cases).
Table 4 shows the initiations, measures and success ratio by type
of procedure. The overall success ratio of the U.S. investigations is 0.47,
which means that the probability for a petitioner to win a case is almost 50
percent.
Table 5 shows the top 12 subject countries of U.S. investigations.
Japan appears in the first place with 60 initiations or 10 percent, followed
____________________
17  It seems that there have been problems identifying the origin of the dumped products
when they are imported from the ex-Soviet Union states.
18  Sectors are defined in accordance with the Harmonized System Sections (HS Section).
19  Measures include only duty orders.
20
  See Miranda, Torres and Ruiz, op. cit., pp. 6-7.











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































closely by China with 55 initiations or 9 percent. As to their participation
in the total number of adopted measures, Japan’s and China’s share  grow
to 14 and 11 percent respectively. Other countries with shares over 5 percent
of initiations are Korea (7 percent), Taiwan and Canada (6 percent each),
and Brazil and Italy (5 percent each). Mexico ranks eighth with 20 procedures
and a share of 3 percent. Under the period of review, the US initiated cases
involving a total of 63 countries.
Something interesting from Table 5 is that the two lowest success
ratios correspond to the United States’ NAFTA partners: Canada (0.27)
and Mexico (0.40). Brazil’s measure equals that of Mexico. The countries
with the highest ratios are Italy, Japan, China, Korea and Germany, with
ratios of 0.66, 0.65, 0.58, 0.55 and 0.54, respectively. Also worth of noticing
is the fact that three of these countries are also the top three in number of
initiations and measures.
As regard to U.S. investigations with respect to the HS Section21
(Table 6), one is by far the most active: 52 percent of the initiations are
against base metals. This figure grows to 58 percent, when considering
final measures. The three next HS Sections in initiations are electrical
equipment (11 percent), chemicals (10 percent) and plastics (8 percent),
leaving the rest with shares under 5 percent.  Excluding the leathers HS
Section with only one initiation and measure, the highest success ratios are
Table 4: US AD/CVD cases and measures by type of procedure.
  Number    Share in Number of   Share in
Type of      of    the total    final    the total Success
Investigation Initiations of initiations measures of measures   Ratio
     (%)      (%)
Antidumping 484 81 227 80 0.47
Countervailing 114 19 56 20 0.49
Total 598 100 283 100 0.47
Source: Made by the authors with information from the AD and CVD Case
History Tables 1980-1999, ITA, and the Semi Annual reports under Article 16.4
of the United States to the WTO.
____________________
21  Since the United States sources do not include the tariff position of the products
under investigation, the authors classified the cases within the HS sections in accordance
to the nature of the products.
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for prepared foodstuffs, textiles, base metals and plastics, with 0.63, 0.62,
0.54 and 0.52 respectively.
Canada22
As mentioned, from 1987 to 1997 Canada along with Mexico
occupied the fourth place worldwide in the use of antidumping
procedures.23 From 1997 to 1999 Canada initiated a total of 225 AD/CV
investigations: 213 AD cases (95 percent) and 12 CV cases (5 percent).
The success ratio of AD/CV cases was 70 percent, which means that a
petitioner filing a case had 70 percent of probability of obtaining a favora-
ble result if the authority decided to initiate its case. Table 7 shows initiations,
measures and success ratios by type of procedure.
In terms of subject countries, the United Sates is by far the first
target in the Canadian AD/CV system, accounting for 46 initiations and 29
final measures, with shares of 20 and 18 percent respectively.24 The rest of
Table 7: Canadian AD/CVD cases and measures by type of procedure.
  Number    Share in Number of   Share in
Type of      of    the total    final    the total Success
Investigation Initiations of initiations measures of measures   Ratio
     (%)      (%)
Antidumping 213 95 150 95 0.70
Countervailing 12 5 8 5 0.67
Total 225 100 158 100 0.70
Source: Made by the authors with information from the historical listing of
SIMA cases, Canada Customs and Revenue Agency.
____________________
22  The statistical information included in this section was prepared by the authors with
information from the historical listing of the Special Import Measures Act (SIMA)
cases of the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency.
23  See Miranda, Torres and Ruiz, op. cit., pp. 6-7
24  Daniel Schwanen makes a value-oriented analysis for cases from 1989 to 1995 and
finds that the share of the investigations involving US exports is much higher in terms
of import values than in terms of absolute numbers: 61.5 percent vs. 19.5, according to
his data. Daniel Schwanen, “When Push Comes to Shove: Quantifying the Continuing
Use of Trade “Remedy” Laws Between Canada and the United States” in Beatriz
Leycegui, William Robson, S. Dahlia Stein (eds.), Trading Punches: Trade Remedy
Law and Disputes under NAFTA, Washington D.C.: National Planning Association,
1995, pp. 161-181.181
the subject countries have shares under 6 percent, being Germany (13
cases), Brazil (12 cases) and the United Kingdom (11 cases) at the top.
Mexico appears in place 21 with only three cases and one established
measure. Forty-five countries have been involved in AD/CV proceedings
in Canada.
In Table 8, the highest success ratio is for India (0.86), followed by
the so-called “Others” category (0.80) and Brazil in third place. The United
States and Mexico have success ratios below the average. Finally, Table 9
shows the Canadian AD/CV cases and measures broken down by the HS
Section. Once again base metals is in first place in initiations and measures
accounting for 50 percent of the initiations (113 cases) and 62 percent of
the measures (98 cases). Other important HS Sections in terms of initiations
are electrical equipment (23 cases), pulp and paper (22 cases), prepared
foodstuff (14 cases) and footwear (12 cases). In terms of measures, the
distribution differs since electrical equipment goes from the second place
in number of initiations to the seventh place in measures. This difference is
clear if we see the success ratios.  The lowest ratio, excluding minerals and
plastics that have only one initiation with no measure, is for electrical
equipment: 0.17; this is only 4 measures for 23 initiations. The highest
ratios excluding “other manufactures” that have only 2 initiations, are glass
and ceramics (1.00) and base metals (0.87). Other HS Sections with ratios
over the average are pulp and paper (0.82) and vegetables (0.71).
Intra-NAFTA Use of Antidumping and Countervailing Measures
Determination of most intensive user.  Table 10 shows
investigations initiated by NAFTA partners against exports originating within
the region. The information contained in the columns corresponds to subject
countries and the information contained in the rows, to the investigating
country. From 1987 to 1999, 172 initiations occurred between NAFTA
partners. Mexico stands in first place in terms of initiations with 70 (41
percent), the United States appears in second with 53 (31 percent), and
finally Canada with 49 (28 percent) ranks third and last. On the other hand,
the United States was the most affected country with 111 initiations (65
percent) against its products, followed by Canada with 38 (22 percent) and
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Mexico with 23 (13 percent). Almost all the initiations (95 percent) involved
the United States as a party, either as an investigating or subject country;
which implies that between Mexico and Canada there were very few
initiations, only 8. The absolute number of initiations within each
investigating country is more or less the reflect of the volume of imports
from each subject country. Nevertheless, the former methodology, per se
does not provide a valid indicator of the country which uses AD/CV
procedures more intensively.
Another method to measure the intensity with which each country
uses its AD/CV tools is simply by dividing the number of cases by the total
intra-NAFTA import value. The result would be the number of cases for
each, for example, billion dollars.25 This alternative is shown in Table 10
in the seventh column. Roughly, we would say that Canada is almost twice
as much an intensive user, as compared to the US; while Mexico’s intensity
is more than two times that of Canada. The problem of this method is that
it does not consider the size of the economy at stake: Mexico is the country
with less imports, which makes it the “most intensive user;” but it is also
the country with the smallest economy, so we can expect that the imports
are relatively high for the size of the market.
Finally, a proposed alternative, is that which measures intensity in
terms of the “penetration grade” that the imports have in the investigating
market. In other words, the amount of competition that those imports
generate in the exporting market, or how much they affect producers of
this latter market. Under this methodology, the “penetration grade” is
calculated by at first obtaining the imports/GDP ratio. Then dividing the
number of initiations by the imports/GDP ratio, to obtain a ratio of intensity
in the use of AD/CV procedures. The ratio of intensity which results provides
____________________
25  This method is equivalent to comparing the share of initiations of each country in
the Intra-NAFTA total to their share in the imports value also in the intra-NAFTA total.
See Miranda, Torres and Ruiz; and Thomas Prusa “An Overview of the Impact of U.S.
Unfair Trade Laws” in Beatriz Leycegui, William B.P. Robson, S. Dahlia Stein (eds.),
Trading Punches: Trade Remedy Law and Disputes under NAFTA, Washington D.C.,
National Planning Association, 1995, pp.183-204. The result of each method would be
the same measuring which country is more intensive in the use of AD/CV procedures
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the number of initiations for each percentage point of the “imports
penetration.”
Column nine of Table 10 includes the calculation of the ratio of
intensity for NAFTA’s imports: the number of cases initiated between NAFTA
partners divided by the imports/GDP ratio, calculated only with imports
from NAFTA’s partners. The last column includes the intensive ratio
calculated with the same methodology for imports from other non-NAFTA
countries (total number of cases initiated against other countries, by the
imports/GDP ratio calculated with imports from all other countries). A first
conclusion is that the three countries use less intensively AD/CV cases
against NAFTA’s partners than against the rest of the world. Particularly,
Canada uses AD/CV procedures seven times more intensively against third
countries than its NAFTA partners; Mexico six times; and the United States
three times. A possible explanation to this phenomena could be the existence
of NAFTA’s Chapter XIX review system. Under this methodology, the
United States happens to be the most heavily intensive user of AD/CV
procedures, either against NAFTA’s partners (exceeding Canada by six
times and Mexico four times) or third countries (exceeding Canada by
three times and Mexico by two times).
Impact of NAFTA on the number of initiations.  Figure 1 shows
initiations affecting intra-NAFTA trade by partner by year. This figure reveals
that since 1994 the initiations in the three countries fell. In fact, the avera-
ge of intra-NAFTA initiations for the period 1994 to 1999 dropped almost
60 percent (from 18 cases to 8 by year), when compared to those
investigations initiated between 1987 to 1993. This occurred despite the
fact that intra-NAFTA trade grew 142 percent from 1990 to 1999.
The relevant question at this point is what explains the decrease in
the number of cases? To try to answer this question it is relevant to also
look at what occurred with the initiations against the rest of the countries,
to observe if this phenomenon is limited to intra-NAFTA trade. From the
period 1987 to 1993 to the period 1994 to 1999, the average of initiations
against non-NAFTA partners fell from 82 to 51 per year, a reduction of 39
percent. Therefore, the decrease in AD/CV activity took place in intra-187
NAFTA trade, as well in trade with other countries, but the reduction in the
former exceeded the latter.
The reasons for the reduction in the number of initiations are not
clear. Some hypothesis which explain such decrease are: the presence of
low prices of certain cyclical commodities in 1992 and 1993 “pushed” to
the initiation of more cases; trend which was overturned as prices recovered
in subsequent years,26 and the Mexican crisis after 1994 which gave
producers certain exchange rate protection against imports. Two additional
reasons which might explain the decrease in intra-NAFTA cases are: as
mentioned, the implementation of the Chapter XIX review system (see
section below); and the fact that before NAFTA was implemented, AD and
CV measures had been adopted in most of the traditionally affected sectors,
and therefore continued to be in effect for several years after NAFTA’s
entry into force.
Intra-NAFTA Initiations by HS Section.  Figure 2 shows the
distribution of the intra-NAFTA initiations by HS Section. Five sections
cover the 70 percent of the cases (base metals, chemicals, electrical
Figure 1: AD/CVD initiations affecting intra-NAFTA trade by partner.
____________________
26  See Miranda Torres and Ruiz , op. cit, pp. 99. 16.

















Canada Mexico United States
Source:  Made by the authors with the information from cases of each country. See text.












equipment, vegetables and plastics), leaving the other 30 percent spread
across 10 HS Sections. The two Sections with more cases are base metals
and chemicals, in conjunction accounting for more than 50 percent of the
cases. These markets are highly cyclical, which supports the idea that:
first, part of the general decrease of cases can be  explained by the increase
in prices of certain commodities, like steel and fertilizers; and second, that
such markets are not easily subject again to initiations to the extent that
there are still measures in force imposed when the prices where low.
TRADE REMEDIES UNDER NAFTA
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Measures
AD and CV measures under NAFTA are addressed through a look
at the negotiation history, the description and objectives of the most relevant
commitments, as well as the cases filed up to January 2002. An assessment
of the functioning of the AD and CV binational panel review procedures
during NAFTA’s first 8 years of implementation is also offered.
Negotiation.  The unfair trade practices discussions, covering
antidumping and countervailing duty matters were among the most difficult
Figure 2: Share of the AD/CVD initiations affecting intra-NAFTA trade
by HS Section.
Source:  Made by the authors with the information from cases of each country. See text.189
and intense during the NAFTA negotiations. What was at stake was basically
Mexico’s and Canada’s interest of not only increasing their access to their
most important market, the United States, but of securing such access that
had been seriously hampered in the past by the application of such reme-
dies as described in the former section.  To this end, the following proposals
were forwarded by Mexico to the United States, with Canada’s acquiescence
with respect to the first two, at that time. One was replacement of
antidumping laws by antitrust laws (“high ground proposal”). Once trade
between NAFTA Parties became fully liberalized, they would not be able to
initiate antidumping cases against each other.27 Departing from what Canada
had proposed under The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (Canada-US
FTA) negotiations, Mexico designed a transitory mechanism in which the
implementation would occur piecemeal. Antidumping investigations would
cease to be initiated against those products included in a list of “fully
liberalized goods.”28 Once the North American market became totally
integrated, antidumping laws would be replaced by antitrust laws.
For political and economic reasons this proposal was shortly
eliminated from the table of negotiations. However, the Parties did agree
under NAFTA to establish a Working Group on Trade and Competition29
“to report, and to make recommendations within five years of the date of
entry into force of this Agreement (January 1, 1994) on relevant issues
concerning the relationship between competition laws and policies and
____________________
27  
In 1988, New Zealand and Australia agreed to eliminate the application of antidumping
measures against each other under the Protocol to the Australia-New Zealand Closer
Economic Relations Trade Agreement and amended their competition laws so they
could apply to anti-competitive practices affecting Australia-New Zealand trade. The
Treaty of Rome of 1957 provided from the outset for the abolition of antidumping laws
among member countries. However, it established a transitional period which ended in
1969, in recognition that tariff and non-tariff barriers were still in existence. In addition,
Canada and Chile in their free trade agreement have negotiated the dumping of
antidumping laws without establishing a substitute system.
28  
To be considered a “fully liberalized” product, two conditions would have to be
fulfilled: the elimination of all applicable tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade within
the free trade area, and the non-existence of anti-competitive practices (predatory
pricing).
29  Article 1504 of NAFTA.
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trade in the free trade area.”  In addition, on December 3, 1993, the three
NAFTA parties issued a joint statement agreeing to “seek solutions that
reduce the possibility of disputes concerning the issues of subsidies, dum-
ping and the operation of the trade remedy laws regarding such practices”
and to set up a working group on trade law to complete this work by
December 31, 1995. The deadlines of both groups have been met, and the
work is far from being completed. However the Parties have extended the
groups work beyond the established time frames.
The U.S. position in this respect was also inflexible. They made it
clear that they would await until the conclusion of the Uruguay Round to
amend their legal framework in correspondence to the agreements reached
under the WTO. Consequently, each Party reserved the right to apply its
AD and CV law. Nevertheless, the Parties did agree that amendments to
such laws are subject to certain rules under NAFTA: the amending statute
must specify that it applies to goods from the other Parties to the Agreement;
written notification to the other Parties of the amendments to be adopted
must be made in advance to their enactment; and such amendments must
be consistent with the GATT, the Agreement on Antidumping, the
Agreement on SCM, and the object and purpose of NAFTA and Chapter
19 (Review and Dispute Settlement in Antidumping and Countervailing
Duty Matters).30
A panel procedure to review statutory amendments was introduced
in Chapter 19, to be used when a Party considers that an amendment of
another Party does not comply with the aforementioned rules or have the
function and effect of overturning a decision of a binational panel of review
of final AD/CV determinations. In case the panel confirms the above, and
the Parties do not reach agreement on a mutually satisfactory solution, the
affected Party may take comparable legislative or equivalent executive
action, or terminate the Agreement with regard to the amending Party.31
As of January 2002, no case had been filed under this mechanism.
____________________
30  NAFTA, Article 1902.
31  NAFTA, Article 1903.191
Establishment of binational panel review procedures such as those
contemplated under Chapter 19 of the Canada-US FTA,32 under which
international trade experts replace domestic administrative and judicial review
of AD and CV determinations issued by the national agencies of NAFTA
Parties, regarding goods of North American origin.  This proposal was
incorporated to NAFTA also under Chapter 19.33 However, Mexico faced
opposition from its trading partners due to their perception that jurists from
Canada or the United States able to apply Mexico’s civil law correctly, nor
would Mexican jurists be able to adapt to Canadian or American common law
practices.
Mexico was obliged to accept certain commitments in order to be
granted access to binational review panels. First, to appease U.S. concerns
that constitutional constraints in Mexico might interfere with the panel process,
a new mechanism was incorporated under Chapter 19 of NAFTA to “safeguard
the panel review system.”34 Specifically, the U.S. wanted to avoid that by
means of the juicio de amparo (habeas corpus),35 that binational panel
resolutions would be revoked, and therefore not enforced.
Under such mechanism, if a Party alleges interference in the panel
process, and a special committee established to analyze this specific issue
makes a finding that such is the case, the complaining Party can suspend the
operation of the AD/CV panel system with respect to the non compliant Party
or suspend to the latter any other benefit under NAFTA. Until January of
2002, this review system has not been invoked. The amparo proceeding
certainly constitutes a permanent threat to the panel system. If a panel decision
is revoked affecting the United States or Canada interests by means of an
____________________
32  Under this Agreement, panels were meant to be a temporary mechanism (to be in
place for a maximum time limit of seven years). This mechanism was to disappear once
the Parties agreed on an alternate system.
33  Binational panels are also ruled according to the Rules of Procedure of Article 1904
of the NAFTA, and the Code of Conduct for Dispute Settlement Procedures of Chapters
XIX and XX of the NAFTA.
34  Article 1905 of NAFTA.
35  Among the most important functions of the amparo proceedings are to protect
individual guarantees, to test allegedly unconstitutional laws, to contest judicial
decisions, and to review official administrative acts and resolutions.
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amparo, Mexico could loose one of the most important benefits negotiated
under NAFTA.36 However, it could not commit itself under NAFTA to deny to
its nationals this ultimate, extraordinary constitutional review procedure,
centerpiece of Mexicans bill of rights, since all international agreements must
be consistent with Mexico’s Constitution.37 Second, Mexico had to implement
several procedural changes in its trade law, to increase the level of transparency
of antidumping and countervailing proceedings.38
Description and Objectives of Binational Review Panel
Procedures.  Under NAFTA (Article 1904.1), a Party on its own
initiative or if requested by an interested person39 “may request that a
____________________
36  NAFTA negotiators recognize that “Chapter 19 was the key compromise between
the United States and Canada- and then between the United States and Mexico- that
enabled the parties to conclude a free trade agreement”, Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez,
Jonathan T. Fried, Charles E. Roh, Jr, Christianne M. Laizner, and David W. Oliver,
“Nafta Chapter 19: Binational Panel Review of Antidumping and Countervailing
Duty Determinations”, in Beatriz Leycegui, William B.P. Robson, and S. Dahlia Stein
(eds.). Trading Punches: Trade Remedy Law and Disputes under NAFTA, Washington
D.C.: National Planning Association, 1995, pp. 24-42.
37  Up to January 2002, only one panel decision had been challenged through the
juicio de amparo (three amparo procedures were filed). In fact, the decision rendered in
the first case, reviewed a final determination of Mexico’s competent authorities (flat
coated steel from the United States, MEX-94-1904-01). One of the amparos was finally
attracted by Mexico’s Supreme Court which did not issue a decision on the merits but
dismissed it alleging that the amparo would only proceed against the measure adopted
by the investigating authority implementing the panel’s decision. The other two ampa-
ros filed at an early stage against the panel’s decision were finished under the same
grounds. The subsequent act which implemented  the panel’s decision was never
challenged.
38  Mexico’s specific commitments of amendment were incorporated in NAFTA, Annex
1905.15, Schedule of Mexico. A listing of the specific provisions that were amended or
introduced in Mexican law in order to conform to the aforementioned Schedule is
provided in: Beatriz Leycegui, “A Legal Analysis of Mexico’s Antidumping and Coun-
tervailing Regulatory Framework” in Beatriz Leycegui, William B.P. Robson, and S.
Dahlia Stein (eds.). Trading Punches: Trade Remedy Law and Disputes under NAFTA,
Washington D.C.: National Planning Association, 1995, pp. 64-66.
39  Interested person is that who is entitled under the law of the importing Party to
commence domestic procedures for judicial review of final determinations. This is
usually an: importer, exporter, or domestic producer.193
panel review... a final antidumping or countervailing duty determination
of a competent investigating authority of an importing Party,40 to determi-
ne whether such determination was in accordance with the antidumping
and countervailing duty law41 of the importing Party.”  The panel shall
apply the standard of review42 and the general legal principles that a court
of the importing Party would apply to review final determinations.43 This
makes them unique, since although the panels are international, the law
and the standard of review that they apply are national.
The panel’s decision “may uphold a final determination, or remand
it for action no inconsistent with the panel’s decision... if review of the
action taken by the competent investigating authority on remand is needed,
such review shall be before the same panel, which shall normally issue a
final decision within 90 days of the date on which such remand action is
submitted to it.”44
____________________
40  Annex 1911 defines such authorities from Canada, Mexico and the United States.
41  According to Article 1904.2 of NAFTA: “...the AD/CV law consists of the relevant
statutes, legislative history, regulations, administrative practice and judicial precedents
to the extent that a court of the importing Party would rely on such materials in
reviewing a final determination of the competent investigating authority”.
42  Defined in Annex 1911.
43  NAFTA, article 1904.3. In the first three decisions adopted by panels reviewing
Mexican agency determinations, controversy surged among the panelists to this cases
regarding the powers of the panels and the standard of review to observe. Under these
cases panelists found difficulty in reaching consensus. In addition, the three cases are
interesting to look at since they all raised very complex questions of constitutional
law: they all involved antidumping investigations conducted under an old antidumping
law which was no longer in effect when the panels reviewed the determinations; it was
alleged that the Mexican investigating authority was incompetent since the applicable
laws and regulation did not contemplate it’s existence; and there was no guidance in
Mexican jurisprudence. For further detail on this subject see  Beatriz  Leycegui and
Gustavo Vega-Cánovas, “Eliminating ‘Unfairness’ within the North American Region:
A Look at Antidumping”, in Michael Hart (ed.), Finding Middle Ground-Reforming
the Antidumping Laws in North America, pp. 261-268. Ottawa, Carleton University-
Centre for Trade Policy and Law, 1997, pp. 251-322.
44  Article 1904.8 of NAFTA.
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Panel decisions “shall be binding”45... and no Party may provide
in its legislation for an appeal from a panel decision to its domestic courts.”46
Panels shall issue their final decision within 315 days of the date on which
a request for a panel is made.47 Panels are integrated by five members.
Each Party involved names two panelists and the fifth one is named by the
Parties in dispute by mutual agreement. If agreement is not reached, they
shall decide by lot which of them shall select the fifth panelist.48 The Parties
normally shall appoint panelists from a roster. The roster shall include at
least 75 candidates (each Party shall select at least 25 candidates).49
Only under exceptional circumstances, may their decisions be
reviewed under an extraordinary challenge procedure, by an extraordinary
challenge committee (comprising three members): when panelists have
violated the Code of Conduct (e.g. existence of a conflict of interest); have
departed from a fundamental rule of procedure (e.g. the involved Parties
are denied from participating in the public hearing; or have exceeded their
power, authority or jurisdiction (has failed to apply the proper standard of
review).50 However, it must be additionally proven that either of the former
actions affected the panel’s decision and threatens the integrity of the
binational review process. The committee may vacate the original panel
decision or remand it to the original panel for action not inconsistent with
its decision; as well as deny the challenge if the grounds are not established.51
It must be noted that this procedure before the committee does not constitute
and additional review procedure. This is confirmed by the fact that under
____________________
45  Article 1904.9 of NAFTA.
46  NAFTA, Article 1904.11. Some legal experts have argued that this provision infrin-
ges Mexico’s Constitution by inhibiting the juicio de amparo from operating. Others
diverge from the former opinion since in their view, the amparo is not an appeal
procedure but an extraordinary constitutional review procedure. By the same token,
neither the United States nor Canada is in a position to limit its judicial courts’ authority
over constitutional challenges to NAFTA.
47  NAFTA, Article 1904.14
48  NAFTA, Annex 1901.2, paragraphs 2 and 3.
49  NAFTA, Annex 1901.2, paragraph 1 sets out the rules for the establishment of the
roster.
50  NAFTA, Article 1904.13.
51  NAFTA, Annex 1904.13, paragraph 3.195
the Canada-U.S FTA, of the 49 cases submitted to binational panel review,
only three were subject to an extraordinary challenge, and neither one of
them did the challenge succeed.52 Under NAFTA, of the 75 cases filed in
the 8 years of application of the Agreement, in only one has an extraordinary
challenge committee been requested.53
Finally through the binational review panel procedure Mexico and
Canada seek to accomplish the following objectives:
• reduction in the amount of time involved in pursuing domestic
judicial review of AD/CV final determinations through the various
appelate levels in the United States.
• as a consequence of the above, savings in money to the parties
involved (fewer fees paid to attorneys). This also due to the fact
that decisions would be made within a fixed period of time, and
that they could not be appealed.
• extra savings would be achieved by private individuals through
the transfer of costs from them to the governments, since it is the
latter that carries out the process and assumes the bulk of the
costs of the procedure.
• as a consequence of the above, access to judicial review by small
and medium-sized companies would be enhanced.
• as the numbers of reviews increase, decisions of the administrative
authority are under international scrutiny, this would discourage
unfair claims and unjustified and frivolous administrative petitions
in trade remedy cases; as well as the lax and flexible application
of the trade remedy laws by administrative authorities, whose
decisions were not oftenly appealed, and when appealed, usually
confirmed by the judicial review authorities.
• if panel decisions proved to be fair and objective, the
discouragement of frivolous claims and lax resolutions influenced
____________________
52  The case of fresh swine, chilled and frozen, from Canada (ECC-91-1904-01 USA);
the case of alive swine from Canada (ECC-93-1904-01); and the case of certain softwood
lumber products from Canada (ECC-94-1904-01).
53  The case of cement gray portland and clinker from Mexico (ECC-2000-1904-01
USA). Although filed since March 23, 2000, the parties have not agreed on the
integration of the committee, and therefore a decision on the matter is still pending.
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by political considerations, would also come from the realization
by private individuals and administrative authorities that their
claims and resolutions, respectively, would be either rejected or
remanded or amended if they were not in accordance with the
law.
CASES
In this section, statistical information, covering January 1994 to
January 2002, is provided regarding the activity of binational review panels.
From such data, some conclusions can be drawn on the accomplishment
of the objectives outlined earlier.
Investigated Authority.  During the period of study, 75 cases had
been filed under the binational panels of review: 45 (60 percent) involving
final determinations of the U.S. investigating authority, 19 (25 percent) of
Canada’s, and 11 (15 percent) of Mexico’s (see figure 3).
Type of investigation.  As of January 2002, of the 75 cases filed
under Chapter XIX of NAFTA, 72 had to do with dumping practices and
only three with subsidies. All the subsidies cases involve revision of
decisions of the United States administrative authority.
Affected sectors.  Consistent to what occurs at the national level,
a reduced number of sectors have been subject to review under binational
panels: the metallurgic sector leads the list with 42 cases; followed by
animal products (HS Section I), vegetables (HS Section II) and prepared
foodstuffs (HS Section IV) with 11 cases; mineral products, 9; chemicals,
6; and other goods, 7 (electrical equipment, ceramic and textiles) (see fi-
gure 4).
Status.  Of the 75 cases filed: 26 were concluded; in 24 the panels’
decision has not (see table 11). been issued; in 3 the panels’ decision is
pending of implementation; and 22 were withdrawn. (see table 11).197
vs. DMNR o CITT (Canada) 19
25.0%
vs. Secofi (Mexico) 11
15.0%
vs. DOC (United States) 45
60.0%
Figure 3: Chapter 19 -- Binational Panels Investigated Authority
(January 1994-2002).














† Department of Commerce
‡ Deputy Minister of National Revenue or the Canadian International Trade Tribunal.
Source:  Elaborated with data from the Ministry of the Economy and the Mexican Section of the Secretariat of Free Trade Agreements.
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Panels’ decisions. Regarding the 29 cases in which the panels
issued a decision (table 12),54in 14 (48 percent) they confirmed the
determinations of the investigating authority, and in 15 they remanded the
cases for new determinations  (52 percent).55 Note that panels reviewing
U.S. and Canada investigating authorities have in 38 and 80 percent
respectively of the cases deferred to their decision. This has not occurred
when reviewing decisions from Mexican authorities, were 83 percent of
their determinations have been overturned.
Panels’ vote.  Of the 29 decisions rendered by binational panels,
25 of them were adopted unanimously (86 percent); and 4 with a majority
vote. In these latter cases, in neither of them did the vote split according to
nationality (table 13) It is interesting to note that in all cases reviewing
Canadian investigating authorities, the panels decisions were all unanimous.
Time.  In only six of the 29 cases with a decision, the binational
panel issued its final decision within the 315 days deadline provided for in
the Agreement (starting from the date of request for a panel). An important
Table 11: Status of Chapter 19 cases (January 2002).
Cases Mexico U.S. Canada Total
Concluded 5 11 10 26
Withdrawn 3 14 5 22
Pending Implementation 2 18 4 24
of Panel Decision
Total 11 45 19 75
Source: Elaborated with data from the Ministry of the Economy and the
Mexican Section of the Secretariat of Free Trade  Agreements.
____________________
54  Note that 29 cases are reported, when it has been indicated that only 26 have
concluded. This is explained by the fact that an extraordinary challenge review has
been requested in one case, which is still pending of resolution. Two others were
remanded to the administrative authority and are pending of implementation.
55  Although in the majority of the cases, the panels decisions are reported as partially
confirming or partially remanding the final determinations rendered by the Parties
investigating authorities; when reviewing the panels decisions, depending on the
nature of the remand (the specific instructions submitted to the investigating authority)
these have been classified in the Appendix under only two categories, as either
confirming or remanding the decision under review.199
number of cases have significantly surpassed those 315 days (by an avera-
ge of 276 days). The average time of the binational panel procedures has
been of 533 days (See table 14). Once the pending cases are resolved, this
average will substantially be increased, since three were initiated in 1998,
two in 1999 and fourteen in the year 2000.
The delay is closely linked to the time it has taken to integrate the
panels: average time, 256 days, exceeding by 196 the maximum 60 days
time limit from the date of request of a panel.56 There are eight cases in
which panels are pending of integration since 2000 and five since 2001.
Table 12: Panel’s Decisions (January 2002).
Cases Mexico U.S. Canada Total
Concluded 1 5 8 14
Remanded 5 8 2 15
Total 6 13 10 29
Source: Elaborated with data from the Ministry of the Economy and the
Mexican Section of the Secretariat of Free Trade  Agreements.
Table 13: Panel’s Vote (January 2002).
Cases Mexico U.S. Canada Total
Unanimous 4 11 10 25
Majority Vote 2 2 0 4
Total 6 13 10 29
Source: Elaborated with data from the Ministry of the Economy and the
Mexican Section of the Secretariat of Free Trade  Agreements.
Table 14: Average Total Time of Chapter 19 Cases (January 2002).
Cases   Panel    Panel Implementation    Total Panel
decisions integration  of the      procedure
(29 cases)  (42 cases)     (26 cases) (26 cases)
Canada (days) 446 169   80 526
U.S. (days) 523 315 138 566
Mexico (days) 703 224 258 849
Average total 533 256 139 605
   time (days)
Source: Elaborated with data from the Ministry of the Economy and the
Mexican Section of the Secretariat of Free Trade  Agreements.
____________________
56  NAFTA, Annex 1901.2, paragraphs 2 and 3.
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Of the 18 pending cases reviewing U.S. authorities decisions, 13 have not
been integrated. Of those four pending cases reviewing Canadian decisions,
in two of them from the mid 2000, the panel has not been integrated yet. In
all of Mexico’s three pending cases, a panel has already been appointed.
Although the implementation of the decisions account for an
important number of days of the total days of the panel procedure (Canada
15% of the total days, U.S. 24%, and Mexico 30%), they have occurred in
the case of the U.S. and Canada within a considerable shorter amount of
time than that provided for under NAFTA.57
Assessment
Based on Chapter 19 objectives, among the criteria to assess whether
Chapter 19 binational review panels are functioning appropriately are those
relative to: the time length of the proceedings; their cost; and the expertise,
fairness and objectivity of panelists. Closely linked to the last criteria is the
manner in which panels voted, panels degree of deference to the
investigating authorities decisions; and the governments acceptance and
compliance of the panels decisions.
Time.  From the data on the time so far taken to resolve the
proceedings (average time, 533 days), it is not at all clear that Chapter 19
binational panels are serving their purpose of providing decisions which,
in comparative terms, are more expeditious than national judicial reviews.58
Considering the time within the proceedings linked to the panels’ integration
process, the delays in great part are associated to serious problems facing
____________________
57  NAFTA, Article. 1904.8: ... “In no event shall the time permitted for compliance with
a remand exceed an amount of time equal to the maximum amount of time (counted
from the date of filing of a petition, complaint or application) permitted by statute for
the competent investigating authority in question to make a final determination in an
investigation...” This is 240 days in the case of Canada, 260 days in the case of Mexico
and 287 days in the case of the United States.
58  It is estimated that in Mexico the administrative and judicial review procedures take
approximately 540 days to be resolved (18 months). In the other hand, the U.S. Court
of International Trade may take between 540 and 900 days (from 18 to 30 months). If
the matter is taken to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the review
before the two mentioned stages may take from two to five years.201
the appointment of panelists (average time, 256 days). There is a growing
difficulty in finding qualified, available, and non-conflicted panelists.
Due to the expertise and other qualifications required under NAF-
TA, it is not difficult for panelists to encounter conflicts of interest. In fact,
it is common that individuals that act as panelists in binational reviews are
simultaneously acting as attorneys in investigations before investigating
authorities whose actions they themselves are reviewing as panelists.
Panelists fees are another disincentive to the participation of a
panelist in several binational reviews.59 The contemplated fees under NAF-
TA are equivalent to $400.00 Canadian dollars, for an 8 hour day of work.
An attorney hourly fee, with the credentials similar to those who sit in
panels, is nearly equivalent to that amount, and in U.S. dollars. Taking one
case has been sufficient to many panelists with regard to fulfilling their
interest in terms of curriculum and experience.
Finally, associated with the delay of the proceedings, might be the
defendant party’s unwillingness to cooperate in the appointment of panelists,
in occasions in retaliation to the application of a trade remedy measure in
another case or to what occurred in other areas of the trade relationship; or
because the case involves a politically sensitive product. The delay and in
a growing number of occasions, stalemate in the appointment of panels,
specially observed since 1999; if not addressed, may not only threaten
Chapter 19 dispute settlement procedures, but the NAFTA itself.
Cost.  Even under the scenario were panel proceedings are more
expeditious than U.S. and Canada’s national review procedures, the costs
of the first tend to be equivalent or higher than the latter. With respect to
Mexico, filing a case before its review authorities can be almost six times
less expensive than recurring to binational panels. This is explained by the
fact that binational panels follow rules and procedures applicable in
common law legal systems. The oral nature of the procedure and the diverse
____________________
59  
The Parties are currently exploring the possibility of increasing the originally
negotiated fees.
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hearings and documents to be presented contribute to increase the costs
vis a vis those incurred in Mexico’s written based appeal system.
Expertise, fairness and objectivity of panelists. The panel
system comprising five experts in international trade law, in general
constitute a more specialized body than those in charge of reviewing AD/
CVD determinations in the judicial review proceedings in Canada, Mexico
and the United States. The fact that in 86 percent of the cases the panel’s
vote was unanimous, is a proof of the panels fairness and objectivity. This
is additionally confirmed by the governments acceptance of their rulings,
since in only one of the 29 decisions rendered, did they requested an
extraordinary challenge investigation. Moreover, the investigating authority
has also complied in all cases with their decisions within in general a
reasonable period of time.
Finally, perhaps Chapter 19’s most important contribution has to
do with the disciplining of the use of AD/CV measures within the North
American region, specially under a scenario where the Parties have not
agreed on different alternatives for the handling of unfair trade practices.
The decrease in recent years, of initiation of cases between NAFTA Parties
(as mentioned in the previous section) in part may respond to the fact that
the administrative authorities may be more careful when initiating and
imposing duties against their trading partners.
SUMMARY AND PERSPECTIVE THOUGHTS
From 1987 to 1999, the United States was the most important user
worldwide of AD and CV remedies. (Figure 5.) Mexico and Canada ranked
fourth. The probability for a petitioner or domestic producer to succeed in
an AD or CV investigation, “success ratio” (number of AD and CV cases
initiated divided by the number of final measures imposed, see table 15) is
more likely in Canada than in the United States and Mexico (70 percent vs.
47 and 52 percent, respectively). Cases involving NAFTA partners had
lower success ratios than against other third countries.203
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Table 15: AD/CV Cases (1987-1999) -- “Success Ratio.”
Country NAFTA partners Other Countries
Canada 0.61 0.73
Mexico 0.43 0.56
United States* 0.32 0.49
*  This ratio does not consider the cases concluded because of price
undertakings.




United States 81% 19%
In the three North American countries, AD cases superseded the
subsidies cases (table 16).  The United States is the country most affected
by Mexico and Canada AD and CV procedures. Canada is the fifth country
most affected by the United States procedures, and Mexico ranks eighth.
Same place, this last, that Canada has regarding Mexico’s investigations.
Mexico appears in place 21 of Canada’s investigations. The far most affected
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section of the HS Code by AD and CV investigations is the base metal
section.
AD and CV initiations affecting intra-NAFTA trade dropped in
average 60 percent from 1994 to1999, when compared with investigations
initiated between 1987 to 1993. This took place under a scenario where
intra-NAFTA trade increased 142 percent from 1990 to 1999. From 1987
to 1999, 172 initiations took place between NAFTA partners. Mexico stands
first in terms of investigations: 70, compared to 53 of the United States and
49 of Canada. However, these numbers do not serve to indicate which
country uses the AD and CV system more intensively.
An alternative methodology that has been used in the past to
measure intensity is that of dividing the number of cases by the total intra-
NAFTA import value, to determine the number of cases for each billion
dollars of trade. Mexico happens to be twice as intensive user when
compared with Canada, and the latter twice as intensive user when compared
with the United States.
However, the problem with the former methodology is that the
country with less imports and with the smallest economy will necessarily
turn out to be the most intensive user. Consequently, the proposed
methodology to measure intensity is that which has to do with determining
the degree of penetration, the amount of competition that imports generate
in the export market. Calculation is made of the number of cases for each
percentage point in the imports/GDP ratio. In contrast with the results of
the former two methodologies, United States is the most intensive user
against NAFTA partners, followed by Mexico and finally Canada. It is
interesting to note that for the three NAFTA Parties, the intensity ratio with
respect to third countries is higher, suggesting they use of AD/CV measures
less against themselves.
As of January 2002, of the 75 cases filed under Chapter XIX of
NAFTA, 72 had to do with dumping practices and only 3 with subsidies.
Consistent to what has occurred at the domestic level, a reduced number205
of the HS sections have been subject to review, being the base metal section
the most represented.
Regarding the 29 cases of the 75, in which the panels have issued
a decision, in 14 (48 percent) they confirmed the determinations. Canadian
administrative decisions have been the most confirmed when subject to
review by NAFTA’s binational panels, 80 percent of those subject to
revision, followed by the U.S. with 38 percent and Mexico with only 17
percent.
Of the 29 decisions rendered by binational panels, 25 of them were
adopted unanimously (86 percent), and 4 with a majority vote. In these
latter cases, in neither of them was the vote split according to nationality.
During the first eight years of NAFTA enforcement, the average total time
taken by panels to issue their decisions was of 533, when the Agreement
provides for 315 days, following the request for the establishment of a
panel. The delays in the panel procedures are closely linked to delay in
integrating the panels: 256 days average time when the Agreement
establishes a 60 day time limit for this to occur.
In terms of time and cost, it is not clear that NAFTA’s binational
panel procedures have proven to be better than domestic review procedures.
However, binational panels performance has been positive regarding their
degree of expertise, fairness and objectiveness.
NAFTA’s Chapter 19 panels have contributed to discipline the use
of AD/CV measures within the North American region, being to an important
extent responsible for the decrease in initiation of cases between NAFTA
Parties (despite significant increases in trade flows). Administrative
investigating authorities of the three countries have been more careful when
initiating and imposing duties against their trading partners.  Under a
scenario in which NAFTA partners will continue to use “trade remedies to
remedy their trade” because of market imperfections, they shall observe
the principles and obligations of the WTO Agreements and NAFTA.
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NAFTA Parties shall continue negotiating multilaterally on pending
issues in order to further discipline the application of trade remedies,
reducing the discretion that is still present in trade remedy investigations.
Considering the serious problems associated with the integration
of  NAFTA´s Chapter 19 binational panels, it is urgent that parties agree:
on a roster of panelists; on improving the benefits and payments offered to
them; in strengthening the role of the Secretariat (exerting functions simi-
lar to those of the WTO Secretariat) and if necessary on substituting the
present ad hoc panels by a permanent tribunal. Since the elimination of
AD laws within NAFTA seems unfeasible in the short and middle term,
Parties should work towards negotiating less trade-restrictive AD rules to
be applied between them, and in applying safeguards with greater frequency
when required.
Finally, diminishing trading of remedies to remedy trade among
NAFTA partners will occur when:
• a higher degree of specialization in the production processes is
reached within the North American region; thus reaching a higher
degree of integration.
• consumers and domestic producers (users of intermediate goods
usually investigated), become better organized to counter the
political pressure exerted by very specific domestic industries.
• the domestic industry of Canada, Mexico and the U.S. have better
adapted to competition and thus the reallocation of the production
factors has taken place to improve the regions´ competitiveness.
• in sum, once the losers of the liberalization are substantially
reduced or have disappeared.
Perhaps, only when  the former conditions have occurred, shall we obser-
ve willingness from NAFTA’s trading partners to eliminate between them
the application of AD laws and procedures that have proven to be in part
science, in part art and even in part religion.207
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